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Imaginative resistance refers to a phenomenon inwhich people resist engaging
in particular prompted imaginative activities. On one influential diagnosis of
imaginative resistance, the systematic difficulties are due to these particular propo-
sitions’ discordance with real-world norms. is essay argues that this influential
diagnosis is too simple. While imagination is indeed by default constrained by
real-world norms during narrative engagement, it can be freed with the power of
genre conventions and expectations.
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man, says David Hume in An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. Our pre-theoretical understanding agrees. In
important ways, imagination seems to be the the opposite of belief: unbounded from
actuality, free to wander through possibilia, and unconstrained by norms. However,
in recent years philosophers have uncovered a curious collection of phenomena that
challenges our pre-theoretical understanding of imagination, especially its alleged lack
of normative governance.1 As a first pass, imaginative resistance is the collection of
phenomena concerned with people’s systematic difficulties with imagining particular
propositions, notably morally deviant ones.
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Onone influential diagnosis of imaginative resistance, the systematic difficulties are
due to these particular propositions’ discordancewith real-world norms.2 When a story
says that female infanticide is morally right, people have a hard time really imagining so
because this proposition is contrary to themoral norms that (we take to) hold in the real
world. Other normatively deviant propositions can evoke imaginative resistance too.
When a story says that a knock-knock joke told for the billionth time is still hilarious,
people have a hard time imagining so because this proposition is contrary to the
aesthetic norms that (we take to) hold in the real world. On this diagnosis, imaginative
resistance shows that imagination is in fact constrained by norms—contrary to Hume’s
assertion and our pre-theoretical understanding.
is essay argues that this influential diagnosis is incomplete, and that a complete
diagnosis requires acknowledging two additional features of imaginative resistance.
First, imaginative resistance only shows that imagination can be constrained by norms
under the particular frame ofnarrative engagement. at is, the normative constraint on
imagination arises from a particular project we undertake—when we use imagination
for the sake of gaining aesthetic pleasure from prompts such as fictions. Second,
even during narrative engagement, the normative constraints on imagination can be
moderated by genre.3 e appropriate classification of an imaginative prompt can
change the norms that govern its fictional world and our corresponding imaginings.
Together, these additional features of imaginative resistance suggest amore complicated
diagnosis of imaginative resistance, on which not all propositions that are contrary to
real-world norms inevitably evoke imaginative resistance, even if some do. Imagination
is by default constrained by real-world norms during narrative engagement, but it can
be freed with the power of genre conventions and expectations.
e ambition of this essay is to clarify the reciprocal relationships that exist between
the three central concepts in the title. Primarily, it does so by showing that puzzling
data concerning genre differences in imaginative resistance can be traced to genre’s
role in shaping the normativity and psychology of narrative engagements. But also,
secondarily, it does so by using imaginative resistance as a test case for a more general
picture concerning genre’s role in narrative engagements. To realize this ambition, the
essay will proceed in three steps. Section 1 clarifies the phenomena under investigation
in three ways: it delineates the different facets of the phenomena, it frames the phe-
nomena under the setting of narrative engagement, and it presents the puzzling data
concerning genre differences. Section 2 synthesizes insights from literary theory and
experimental psychology to generate a picture of genre’s influence on the normative
2In my view, Gendler (2000, 2006), Walton (1994, 2006), Weatherson (2004), and Yablo (2002) all give
versions of this diagnosis, which is further discussed in section 3.4. is diagnosis’s influence has extended
beyond narrow discussions of imaginative resistance. For example, Driver (2008) has used this diagnosis
to elucidate the nature of human moral psychology.
3Others in the imaginative resistance literature have suggested that genre has a role to play in explaining
imaginative resistance. For example, Gendler (2000) briefly mentions a distinction between distorting vs.
non-distorting fictions, and Weinberg (2008) and Nanay (2010) mention genre in their accounts of the
psychology of imaginative resistance. In my view, these early efforts have not captured genre’s complexity
and normative significance. Hence, while this essay is influenced by these early efforts, it also aims to go
beyond them. eir influence is further discussed in section 1.3.
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and psychological aspects of narrative engagement. Section 3 then uses that picture to
provide a more complete diagnosis of imaginative resistance, and discusses its relation
to existing accounts of the phenomena.
1 Imaginative Resistance
1.1 Delineating Resistance Phenomena
ephenomena under investigation have to dowith people’s systematic difficulties with
imagining particular propositions. Take Tamar Szabó Gendler’s initial characterization
as our rough guide:
When we engage in the sort of make-believe that contemplation of fictional
scenarios evokes, we are largely unconstrained by what we take to be factual. […]
When an author invites us to contemplate a fictional scenario, she seems to have
a great deal of freedom in how she directs our imagination. […] But she seems
to have much less freedom in what she makes fictionally true as far as matters
of moral assessment are concerned. e trick that allows an author complete
freedom in dictating whether or not character A murders character B is much
less effective if what the author wants to dictate is that the murder is, for instance,
praiseworthy, or noble, or charming, or admirable. So the puzzle is this: What
explains why a trick so effective in so many realms is relatively ineffective here?
(Gendler 2000, 56–58)
eheart of the phenomena involves an asymmetry. People’s imaginings seem relatively
unconstrained with respect to one type of proposition (for Gendler, the factual ones),
but relatively constrained with respect to another type of proposition (for Gendler, the
moral ones that are contrary to the real-world moral norms). And it is not just people’s
imaginings, but also what authors can do with works of fiction. Authors seem relatively
unconstrained in specifying what is true in a fictional world with respect to one type of
proposition (the factual ones), but relatively constrained with respect to another type
of proposition (the moral ones).
Since Gendler’s earliest essay on this topic, philosophers have made incremental
refinements in characterizing the phenomena. For example, it is generally accepted
now that the asymmetry is not precisely between factual propositions andmoral propo-
sitions, but between broader types of propositions—such as descriptive vs. normative
or non-response-dependent vs. response-dependent. To maintain neutrality, let us
call the propositions that fall in the second category (moral, normative, or response-
dependent), whatever its precise boundaries turn out to be, puzzling propositions.
e most important refinement, though, is the differentiation of various facets
of the phenomena (Weatherson 2004; Walton 2006). is refinement clarifies the
explananda of diagnoses of imaginative resistance. We can roughly divide these facets in
away that highlights two aspects of resistance phenomena that need to be explained: the
normative and the psychological. (Of lesser importance, this refinement also suggests
that better terminology is needed. Since the phenomena have to do with more than
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imagination, we should drop the confusing term “imaginative resistance” and dub them
resistance phenomena.)
e normative aspect of resistance phenomena presents the fictionality puzzle,
which asks why puzzling propositions are comparatively difficult to make fictional—
that is, true in a story.4 First, puzzling propositions bring out normative constraints on
authorial freedom. Although authors usually have the authority to make a proposition
fictional simply by saying so, it appears that they do not have the same freedom
when it comes to puzzling propositions. Second, puzzling propositions also bring
out normative constraints on readers’ imagination. On arguably the most influential
theory of fictionality today, what is fictional is what is to be imagined (Walton 1990).
e normative constraints on fictional propositions therefore double as normative
constraints on propositions that readers ought to imagine.
e psychological aspect of resistance phenomena presents two puzzles that concern
people’s actual responses to puzzling propositions. e imaginative puzzle asks why
people in fact have comparative difficulties with imagining puzzling propositions. e
phenomenological puzzle asks why people in fact experience a sense of jarring confu-
sion when they encounter and attempt to imagine puzzling propositions. Moreover, the
imaginative difficulties and the jarring phenomenology oen go hand in hand. So, an
additional desideratum for a diagnosis of resistance phenomena is to explain why the
imaginative puzzle and the phenomenological puzzle are related in this way.
1.2 Framing Resistance Phenomena
It is not enough to delineate the puzzles associated with resistance phenomena. To truly
grasp their nature, we have to situate them appropriately. ere is an important feature
of puzzling sentences and propositions that oen goes unnoticed: puzzling propositions
are not puzzling in themselves, but puzzling as parts of narratives.5 Early discussions of
resistance phenomena make this feature evident; Walton (1994), Gendler (2000), Yablo
(2002), andWeatherson (2004) are all explicit about introducing resistance phenomena
with short stories.6 ey do so because resistance phenomena arise during the mental
project of narrative engagements.
4Like Gendler (2000), I want to emphasize that the difficulties with puzzling propositions are only
comparative, relative to normal experiences with narratives, and not absolute.
5In contrast, Todd (2009) characterizes resistance phenomena as concerning “isolated, a-contextual
single propositions”. He consequently concludes that philosophers like Gendler and Walton are mistaken
in thinking that there are genuine philosophical puzzles concerning a special class of isolated, a-contextual
single propositions. While I agree with Todd that there are no genuine puzzles concerning particular
propositions, I disagree with his characterization of resistance phenomena.
6Walton explicitly emphasizes the extent towhich resistance phenomena are characteristic of narratives:
“Can an author simply stipulate in the text of a story what moral principles apply in the fictional world, just
as she specifies what actions characters perform? If the text includes the sentence, ‘In killing her baby,
Giselda did the right thing; aer all, it was a girl’ or ‘e village elders did their duty before God by forcing
the widow onto her husband’s funeral pyre’, are readers obliged to accept it as fictional that, in doing what
they did, Giselda or the elders behaved in morally proper ways? Why shouldn’t storytellers be allowed to
experiment explicitly with worlds of morally different kinds, including ones even they regard as morally
obnoxious?” (Walton 1994, 37; my emphases).
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A mental project is an activity that we undertake which have special normative
and cognitive significance. is theoretical concept bears similarities to what Neil Van
Leeuwen calls “practical setting”.7 Consider, for example, what Van Leeuwen says about
the practical setting of make-believe.
… they’ve set up one such situation, or practical setting as I call it. In this case,
it’s the practical setting of make‐believe. e proposal then, is that being in the
practical setting of make‐believe allows imaginings to take on a belief‐like role
in relation to desires in guiding actions, where it is the agent’s awareness of that
setting that constitutes the actions as full pretense. ¶ e setting of make‐believe
is constituted by a cluster of three shared expectations that agents have, when they
are pretending together. … (Van Leeuwen 2016)
We can draw general lessons about what I call mental project from Van Leeuwen’s
characterizations of the practical setting of make-believe. In general, a mental project
can allow for ad hoc reconfigurations of an agent’s cognitive apparatus. In the case of
make-believe, according to Van Leeuwen, it allows for imaginings to play a more direct
role in guiding actions. In general, a mental project can also temporarily reshape our
expectations. In the case of make-believe, according to Van Leeuwen, an agent takes on
particular sets of norms related to the pretense when she is in that practical setting.
Narrative engagement is the mental project we undertake when we recruit imag-
ination for the sake of gaining aesthetic pleasure from imaginative prompts, such as
fictional narratives.8 Imagination, in contrast, is a propositional attitude that is recruited
in a variety of mental projects.9 For example, in addition to narrative engagement,
imagination is recruited for make-believe and counterfactual reasoning.
Not all interactions with narratives that recruit imagination count as narrative
engagements. A student could read a novel solely in preparation for an upcoming test.
Even if he recruits his imagination in order to truly understand the fictional world of the
novel, he seems to not be genuinely imaginatively engaging with the novel. Likewise, a
censor for the film ratings board could watch a movie solely for its sexual and violent
content. Even if she recruits her imagination in order to dutifully accomplish these
evaluations, and consequently have the requisite vivid emotional responses, she seems
to not be genuinely imaginatively engaging with the movie either.
7Van Leeuwen (2009) introduces the theoretical concept of practical setting, which in turn draws
inspirations fromBratman (1992) (the concept of context in practical reasoning) and fromGoffman (1974)
(the concept of frame).
8e difference and relation between narrative engagement and imagination is analogous to the
relationship between doxastic deliberation and belief that Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005)
explicate. When belief is recruited in doxastic deliberation, they are governed by the norm of truth. But
belief can also be governed by other norms when it is recruited in other mental projects. Moreover,
doxastic deliberation involves not just belief, but also its relation to other attitudes and processes, such
as inferential mechanisms.
9As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on imagination (Gendler 2011) shows, the term
“imagination” is highly ambiguous; nevertheless, referring to a propositional attitude is amongst the
relatively standard uses of the term. Liao and Doggett (2014) provides an overview of the extensive debate
on the nature of imagination in the attitudinal sense, and Liao and Gendler (2011) explores the various
uses—that is, recruitments in different mental projects—of imagination in the attitudinal sense.
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What is distinctive of narrative engagement, in contrast with other (non-standard)
interactions with narratives, is that one undertakes the project for the sake of gaining
aesthetic pleasure from the work itself. (Of course, aesthetic pleasure need not be the
only goal.) In order to derive enjoyment from the work itself—as opposed to from one’s
own creative imagination, for example—another important characteristic of narrative
engagement is its inherent normative requirement to place one’s imaginings and related
psychological responses under the governance of the narrative’s prescriptions. In slogan
form: during narrative engagement, one aims one’s imaginings at fictionality.
While resistance phenomena arise during narrative engagements, they do not typi-
cally arise with other mental projects that recruit imagination. Consider counterfactual
reasoning as an example.10 During moral deliberation, one might ask oneself the
question what if female infanticide were morally right. In reasoning about the answer
to this question, one may need to vividly imagine female infanticide to be morally
right and undergo related psychological responses, and then use those imaginings and
psychological responses to draw out the potential consequences by imagining what else
would be true in such a world. However, as we can observe from our own experiences,
people tend not to have comparative difficulties with imagining a morally deviant
proposition when they undertake the mental project of counterfactual reasoning for
the sake of moral deliberation.
Framing resistance phenomena in the appropriate context—the mental project of
narrative engagement—has profound implications for situating and explaining these
phenomena. Instead of explaining resistance phenomena in isolation, we should situate
them within a general framework of the normativity and psychology of narratives.
e general normative question concerns the grounds on which a proposition gets to
be fictional in a narrative. e general psychological question concerns the factors
that causally influence people’s responses to narratives. In this light, the fictionality,
imaginative, and phenomenological puzzles associated with resistance phenomena are
narrow variants of the general normative and psychological questions regarding narra-
tives. is conception of resistance phenomena and the puzzles increases, rather than
diminishes, their philosophical importance. In the same way that explaining specific
Gettier cases can give us insight into the nature of knowledge, explaining resistance
phenomena can give us insight into the normativity and psychology of narratives. In
the same way that Gettier cases can act as tests on theories of knowledge, the puzzles
associated with resistance phenomena can act as tests on accounts of narratives.
1.3 Complicating Resistance Phenomena
Recall the dialectic mentioned in the introduction. While early influential accounts
of resistance phenomena tend to focus on the nature of puzzling propositions, it is
distinctive of more recent works on resistance phenomena to focus on the difference
that genre (and more broadly, context) makes (Liao and Gendler 2015). For example,
Bence Nanay suggests that
10Byrne (2005) argues for the importance of imagination in counterfactual reasoning. Williamson
(2007) leans on Byrne’s account and grounds an epistemology of modality on counterfactual reasoning.
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… even the same readers may experience imaginative resistance when they
encounter a sentence in one context, while not experiencing anything of that sort
when they encounter it in another context. Some sentences that normally trigger
imaginative resistance fail to do so if they are embedded in a surreal genre or a
parody. (Nanay 2010, 589)
Nanay’s suggestion is that genre can be a difference-maker in evoking or dissipating
resistance phenomena. In making this suggestion, Nanay is echoing and exemplifying
similar suggestions made in other recent works on imaginative resistance (Weinberg
2008; Willard 2015).
Most commonly, philosophers motivate the idea that genre can be a difference-
maker in evoking or dissipating resistance phenomena with appeals to the diversity of
moral landscapes in real-world narratives. For example, JonathanWeinberg and Aaron
Meskin suggest that
the morally and affectively disabling conditions of many cartoons […] keep us
from attending to the prima facie moral demands of sentient creatures likeWile E.
Coyote or Daffy Duck, enabling us to take pleasure in a world where their pains
are morally nugatory, or perhaps even praiseworthy. (Weinberg andMeskin 2006,
190)
Weinberg and Meskin are pointing to cartoons as one genre in which we sometimes
do not typically find morally deviant propositions to be puzzling. In other words, a
narrative’s membership in the genre of cartoons has the capacity to dissipate resistance
phenomena.
Furthermore, the idea that genre can be a difference-maker in evoking or dissipating
resistance phenomena has recently been put to the empirical test. In one study, Shen-yi
Liao, Nina Strohminger, and Chandra Sekhar Sripada present study participants with a
pair of stories (in random order):
Seeing the Light. February 14th, 2010. Texas. ere was only darkness. Everyone
gathered around the preacher, Wayne Howell, for an announcement. “A message
from the almighty came to me. e youngest girl must be sacrificed in order to
bring back the light.” ey believed his every word. All eyes then turned to Mary,
who had just given birth to a baby girl. Reluctantly, Mary gave her baby to the
preacher to be sacrificed.
e Sun of the Second Creation. A long, long time ago, in the valley of Mexico,
there was only darkness. Everyone gathered around the high priest, Cihuacoatl,
for an announcement. “A message from the gods came to me. e youngest girl
must be sacrificed in order to renew the sun.” ey believed his every word. All
eyes then turned to Ixchel, who had just given birth to a baby girl. Reluctantly,
Ixchel gave her baby to the high priest to be sacrificed.
Aer reading each story, participants were asked to consider the same proposition (with
only the protagonist’s name changed):Mary [Ixchel] did the right thing (Liao et al. 2014,
351). Specifically, participants were asked to assess whether the proposition is fictional
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in each of the two stories. (An earlier study showed that this question about fictionality
generates the same pattern of results as an analogous question about imagination—
namely, whether participants found it easy or hard to imagine the proposition.)
Although the two stories have many surface similarities, they contain cues to
different genres. “Seeing the Light” is a police procedural, but “e Sun of the Second
Creation” is an Aztec myth.11 Liao, Strohminger, and Sripada found that genre can
indeed make a difference to participants’ fictionality judgment. Although participants
thought that in the fictional world of “e Sun of the Second Creation” Ixchel’s action
is morally right, they thought that in the fictional world of “Seeing the Light” Mary’s
action is morally wrong. In other words, participants typically experienced resistance
phenomena when prompted to imagine that the protagonist did the morally right thing
with “Seeing the Light”, but not with “e Sun of the Second Creation”.
As is the case with other short stories that philosophers employ in this literature, the
stories that Liao, Strohminger, and Sripada employ are necessarily schematic in order
to bring out the relevant difference.12 Nevertheless, their results do cohere with sugges-
tions that philosophers have made about genre’s connection to resistance phenomena
and the real-world examples that philosophers have pointed to. Collectively, these data
points motivate a need to construct an explanation of resistance phenomena that gives
genre its due.
2 Genre and Narrative Engagement
Literary theorist Tzvetan Todorov characterized genre as having dual functions: “as
‘horizons of expectations’ for readers and as ‘models of writing’ for authors” (Todorov
1990, 18). Genre influences both artists’ constructions of narratives and audiences’
experiences with them—in other words, both what is fictional and what is imagined.
is section draws inspiration fromTodorov’s characterization of genre and synthesizes
insights from humanistic and scientific inquiries on genre to elucidate genre’s signifi-
cance for the normativity and psychology of narrative engagement.13
11One might note that the two stories also differ in, for example, their time and place settings. I am
inclined to count these differences as genre differences, since different genres can call for different time
and place settings and different time and place settings can cue different genres. However, the same
philosophical points in this essay can be made if we focused less on genre specifically and focused more
on contextual factors generally. See Liao et al. (2014), footnote 37, for discussion of this complication.
12See Tanner (1994), Mothersill (2003), and Todd (2009) for cautionary notes about drawing philosoph-
ical conclusions from such schematic stories.
13ere are few systematic discussions of genre in contemporary philosophical aesthetics. Furthermore,
for the most part, contemporary analytic aestheticians have overlooked the development of genre theory
in literature, film, and other media studies. (Currie (2004) and Laetz and Lopes (2008) are two notable
exceptions.) For historical background of genre theory in these cognate fields, see the classic essays
collected in Duff (2000). For contemporary discussions, see Frow (2006) and the essays collected in Dowd
et al. (2006).
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2.1 Genre
At the most basic level, genres are simply groupings of narratives that are recognized by
the relevant community as special. e notion of genre employed here is thus relatively
broad and also includes what others might call medium, presentation, mode, or style.14
One important role that genres play is classifying narratives. Everyday discussions of
novels, movies, and narratives in other media oen invoke specific genres. At libraries
and bookstores, works are oen organized according to genres. Following Kendall
Walton’s landmark work on categories of art, whether a work is appropriately classified
in a genre depends on a variety of factors: its relevant resemblance to other works in that
genre, the artist’s intentions, critical judgments, and that genre’s propensity for aesthetic
pleasure (Walton 1970). Usually, a work is appropriately classified in more than one
genre, and the multiple genres of the work may overlap one another. Adjudicating the
different factors when they conflict can sometimes be difficult and undoubtedly interest-
and context-dependent. Nevertheless, the frequent invocations of genres in everyday
discussions of narratives demonstrate that people tend to have a good pre-theoretical
grasp on how to classify narratives in the appropriate genres.
However, genre is important for explanations in aesthetics because individual
genres are more than mere classifications.15 Genre also holds implications for the
normativity and psychology of narrative engagement.16 Disagreements about genre
in everyday discussions of narratives are oen more than just disagreements about
classifications. When people disagree about whether a novel is appropriately classified
in the genre of magical realism or realistic fiction, they might also be disagreeing about
whether it is literally true in the story—as opposed to merely metaphorical—that a
character was washed into the world by a great tide of tears. When people disagree
about whether a movie is appropriately classified in the genre of horror or the genre
of black comedy, they might be also disagreeing about whether it would be fitting for
them to laugh at a gruesome decapitation scene. Genre influences the propositions that
are warranted to be fictional in a narrative and the ways that one ought to, and actually
does, engage with a narrative.
2.2 Convention
On the normative side, genre gives authors conventions that constrain what could be
made fictional. Fictional worlds are rich entities; the propositions that are fictional
oen far exceed the propositions that are directly expressed by a narrative. Principles
of generation determine which non-explicitly-expressed propositions are warranted to
be added to a fictional world outright, and which are warranted to be inferred from the
14In other words, I am including many groupings of narratives that are not always recognized as genres.
However, whether a genre is salient depends on the context. us, a genre like experimental fiction can be
salient in the context of literary criticism, but not so in the context of casual conversations.
15Contra Currie (2004), Liao (2014) argues for the legitimacy and importance of genre explanations in
aesthetics, against a background pragmatist and pluralist understanding of aesthetic explanations.
16Liao (2013) and Liao and Protasi (2013) explore genre’s contribution to another aspect of the
normativity and psychology of narrative engagement: how narratives can be responsible for changes in
our attitudes.
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explicitly-expressed propositions.17 For example, the proposition Sherlock Holmes has
only one heart is plausibly fictional in the Sherlock Holmes novels, even though Arthur
Conan Doyle never explicitly says so. e proposition is warranted to be fictional
because real-world biological relationships tend to hold in the Holmes fictional world.
We are warranted to infer the fictionality of the proposition Sherlock Holmes has only
one heart from the fictionality of the explicitly-expressed proposition Sherlock Holmes
is human. Only with these principles can rich fictional worlds be constructed from the
few propositions explicitly expressed by words on a page or images on a screen.
As systematizations of the features common to works in a given genre, genre con-
ventions constrain what is fictional because they constrain which implicit propositions
and which inferential patterns are warranted for a fictional world. Conventions do not
merely catalogue the common features, but also say something about the relationships
between them. As a simplistic example, a convention of the science-fiction genre
is that physical laws of the real world need not hold in the fictional world. In one
sense, this convention is descriptive: it is in fact typical for works that are appropriately
classified in science-fiction to include violations of real-world physical laws. In another
sense, this convention is also normative: being appropriately classified in science-fiction
warrants a work’s inclusion of violations of real-world physical laws. Considered in the
normative sense, genre conventions constrain the nature of relevant fictional worlds
by contributing to the relevant principles of generation that govern the propositions
warranted to be added or inferred.
2.3 Expectation
On the psychological side, genre gives readers expectations that govern imaginings
and related psychological responses. During narrative engagement, people place their
imaginings under a narrative’s prescriptions. On arguably the most influential account
of fictionality today, what is fictional is what a narrative prescribes its readers to imagine
(Walton 1990). Hence, since the conventions of a narrative’s genre constrain what is
fictional, they also constrain what the narrative’s readers are prescribed to imagine. In
order to comply with a narrative’s prescriptions, people align their expectations to the
corresponding conventions.18 As a simplistic example, during a narrative engagement
with a science-fictionwork, a reader ought to accept as fictional and imagine claims that
violate real-world physical laws. Generally speaking, genre conventions generate oughts
about imaginings, and these oughts are the genre expectations that people employ dur-
ing narrative engagements.19 e ability to employ the appropriate genre expectations
17Walton (1990) articulates the role that principles of generation play in generating fictional worlds, but
does not explicitly consider genre as a way of specifying the relevant principles of generation. (However, he
does say, for instance, that criticism requires familiaritywith awork’s “medium, genre, and representational
tradition” (Walton 1990, 184).) Discussions in Lewis (1978, 1983) regarding “inter-fictional carry-overs”
suggest some considerations of genre in generating fictional worlds.
18Weinberg andMeskin (2005)makes similar suggestions about the relationship between genre conven-
tions and readers’ expectations.
19ese oughts have only conditional normativity. Just because one should play by a game’s rules does
not mean that one (unconditionally) should play that game. Similarly, just because one ought to imagine
Shen-yi Liao  Imaginative Resistance, Narrative Engagement, Genre  11
is a practical competence, or know-how, with respect to narrative engagements.
We can put more psychological substance on this philosophical theory by saying
more about genre expectations’ place in the architecture of the mind. Speculatively,
genre expectations are story schemas that people employ during narrative engage-
ments.20 During successful narrative engagements, readers employ genre schemas with
high fluency: quickly, automatically, and unconsciously. In ideal circumstances, read-
ers of narratives employ the appropriate genre expectations in their constructions of the
fictional worlds.21 ese expectations influence the readers’ psychological responses to
the narrative, includingwhat they imagine. e presence of story schemas explains why,
in typical narrative engagements, people tend to simply “go along with the story”. When
readers of narratives do not possess the requisite practical competence—in other words,
when no appropriate genre expectations are accessible to them—they fall short of the
ideal. In such cases, narrative engagements lose their typical ease because deliberate
conscious efforts are demanded from the readers.
ere are reciprocal interactions between genre expectation, fluency in narrative
engagement, and aesthetic pleasure. On the one hand, when readers are able to
undertake fluent narrative engagement by adopting appropriate genre expectations,
they derive more aesthetic pleasure from the experience.22 When readers are unable
to undertake fluent narrative engagement due to a lack of access to appropriate genre
expectations, they might then turn away from the narrative and overlook its aestheti-
cally worthwhile features. On the other hand, readers could also acquire appropriate
genre expectations from compensating aesthetically worthwhile features and increased
exposure to relevantly resembling works.23 Readers are then able to undertake fluent
narrative engagement when increased aesthetic pleasure and familiarity encourage
according to a narrative’s prescriptions does not mean that one (unconditionally) ought to undertake the
project of narrative engagement. Unconditional normative constraints—moral, rational, or otherwise—
dictate which games we should play, as well as which narratives we should engage with. Conditional
oughts about imaginings apply only once a reader has decided, consciously or unconsciously, to undertake
narrative engagement.
20Mandler (1984) articulates the notion of a schema in processing stories. Frow (2006) also connects
genre expectations with story schemas in the context of literary theory. While I will focus on schemas, the
main points here can be understood in terms of other mental models also.
21However, as Liao (2013) notes, it is a common literary technique—in, for example, magical realism—
to have readers experience a temporary lack of fluency initially so that they can be alerted to and then
come to employ the appropriate genre expectations aer hermeneutic recalibration.
22Winkielman et al. (2003) and Reber et al. (2004) review empirical findings suggesting that the fluency
of narrative engagement is a subjectual source of aesthetic pleasure. One possible explanation of the link
between fluency and aesthetic pleasure is that fluency signifies an achievement of understanding. us, it
might be especially pleasurable to engage with a complex narrative fluently, when one is unable to do so
on a first pass due to complexity, because of the achievement in understanding that fluency signifies.
23By no means are these the only ways that readers could acquire appropriate genre expectations.
For example, intellectual understanding of the work’s background, such as the importance of certain
aesthetic features in a tradition, could also help readers form the appropriate genre expectations, especially
regarding which features to attend to. However, compensating aesthetic pleasure and increased familiarity
are particularly worth highlighting in this context because they are, in contrast with intellectual under-
standing, internal to aesthetic experiences. Developmentally, children usually begin to acquire different
expectations for different genres between ages 3 and 5 (Woolley and Cox 2007), shortly aer they acquire
the capacity to separate fantasy from reality (Skolnick and Bloom 2006).
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them to overcome, and ultimately nullify, an initial lack of fluency.
e Rite of Spring offers a stark, if romanticized, illustration of the reciprocal inter-
actions between expectations, fluency, and aesthetic pleasure. Famously, Stravinsky’s
percussive and dissonant ballet caused a riot in the theatre on its premiere. ere
were shouts, fistfights, and the Paris police had to come in at intermission. It is
hard to imagine that the audience members found much aesthetic pleasure in their
experiences with the work. One plausible factor that contributes to the audience
members’ responses is their lack of fluency in engaging with the piece, which results
from their expectations of a ballet at that time. However, it is now widely recognized
that e Rite of Spring is a revolutionary masterpiece, and it has influenced many
subsequent compositions. e piece’s wide recognition and influence open up two
compatible explanations of why nowadays there are no longer shouts and fistfights, but
only applause, at its performances. For one, even if an audience member experiences
an initial lack of fluency in engagement, she might persist for the aesthetic pleasures
expected to be found in the piece itself. For another, as the musical vocabulary used in
eRite of Spring becamemore commonplace as a result of its influence, the increase in
familiarity with and exposure to this musical vocabulary also increases the fluency with
which an audience member is able to engage with the piece. As people’s experiences
with e Rite of Spring demonstrate, a lack of appropriate genre expectations, and a
corresponding lack of fluency, can sometimes be temporary rather than persistent.
3 Genre and Imaginative Resistance
e preceding picture reveals genre’s influence on the normative and psychological
aspects of narrative engagement. Genre conventions contribute to grounding the
notion of fictionality, and genre expectations influence people’s imaginings. With
the resources that this picture provides, this section directly addresses the puzzles
associated with resistance phenomena. To illustrate the solutions to the puzzles, we
will return to the two stories mentioned in section 1.3, “Seeing the Light” (the police
procedural that evokes resistance phenomena) and “e Sun of the Second Creation”
(the Aztec myth that does not evoke resistance phenomena). By addressing all aspects
of resistance phenomena, this section aims to show that genre occupies an important
place in a unifying explanation of resistance phenomena.
3.1 e Fictionality Puzzle
We can see the role that genre conventions play in addressing the fictionality puzzle
by elaborating on the contrast between the two stories presented earlier. “Seeing the
Light” contains cues that place it in the genre of police procedural. e conventions
of this genre is such that its fictional worlds are more or less like ours at a global level.
While there could be differences in the specific events that occur, there could not be
general differences such as differences in the physical laws or themoral norms that apply.
So, when engaging with this story, readers are only warranted to import propositions
that are actually true and employ inferential patterns that make sense in the real world.
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Since giving up one’s baby for sacrifice violates real-world moral norms, doing so is
also wrong according to the fictional moral norms of “Seeing the Light”. e moral
propositionMary did the right thing by giving up her baby to be sacrificed, when placed in
this story, evokes the fictionality puzzle because it is convention-discordant: the genre
conventions that govern this fictional world forbid making a violation of real-world
moral norms fictional. Moreover, recall that the normative constraints on what a reader
ought to imagine doubles as normative constraints on what authors can make fictional.
Hence, the moral proposition’s convention-discordance also means that the author of
“Seeing the Light” lacks the typical authorial freedom tomake it true in the story just by
saying so.
In contrast, “e Sun of the Second Creation” contains cues that place it in the
genre of Aztec mythology. e conventions of this genre is such that its fictional worlds
could be importantly unlike ours at a global level, particularly in the moral dimension.
When engaging with this story, readers are warranted to not import real-world moral
norms into this story’s fictional world but instead take, say, a specific version of divine
command theory to hold in the fictional world. So readers are warranted to take the
actions that the gods command to be morally right to be indeed morally right in the
fictional world. Since the gods demand so, giving up one’s baby for sacrifice is not
wrong according to the fictional moral norms of “e Sun of the Second Creation”. e
moral proposition Ixchel did the right thing by giving up her baby to be sacrificed, when
placed in this story, does not evoke the fictionality puzzle because it is convention-
concordant: the genre conventions that govern the fictional world of “e Sun of
the Second Creation” permit making a violation of real-world moral norms fictional.
Hence, for the same reason as before, the moral proposition’s convention-concordance
also means that the author of “e Sun of the Second Creation” possesses the typical
authorial freedom to make it true in the story just by saying so.
A proposition’s genre convention-discordance is one factor that contributes to the
comparative difficulties with making it fictional. Although conventions, like other
norms, can be broken or reshaped, more effort and skill on an author’s part are required.
As “models of writing” for authors—in Todorov’s words—genre conventions constrain
authorial freedom. A proposition is not always made fictional just because the author
says so. Although authors have a great deal of control regarding the fictional worlds
they create, they cannot decide which propositions get to be fictional simply by fiat.
If all other features of a narrative were to indicate strongly that a work is a realistic
fiction and not a science fiction, then it would be comparatively difficult for the author
to make the convention-discordant proposition there is a spaceship that can travel faster
than the speed of light fictional. Moreover, although authors have a great deal of control
regarding the appropriate genres for their works, they cannot decide which genre
conventions apply simply by fiat either. Douglas Adams cannot make e Hitchhiker’s
Guide to the Galaxy a realistic fiction, no matter how much he sincerely intends it to
be. It clearly does not resemble other realistic fictions, no critic judges it as a realistic
fiction, and engaging with it as a realistic fiction would not produce more interesting
or pleasing aesthetic experiences. Since multiple criteria determine the appropriate
genre for a fiction, authorial intention must be weighed against other criteria and may
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sometimes be overridden. Hence, authorial freedom is neither absolute when it comes
to the appropriate genre of a fiction nor absolute when it comes to the conventions that
govern what could be made fictional.
Genre conventions’ constraint on fictionality urges us to rethink our understanding
of resistance phenomena. Much of the literature has singled out moral deviance as the
focus of resistance phenomena. However, the variety of genres and genre conventions
gives us reason to question the primacy of moral deviance. Some philosophers have
already argued that moral deviance is not necessary to evoke resistance phenomena
(Yablo 2002; Weatherson 2004). I am arguing that the variance in genre conventions
that govern the moral dimension of fictional worlds shows that moral deviance is
not sufficient to evoke resistance phenomena by itself either. Instead, morally de-
viant propositions evokes resistance phenomena when they are also genre convention-
discordant.
Kendall Walton once asked, “ere is science fiction; why not morality fiction?”
(Walton 1994, 37). Are there genres with conventions that permit deviations from
real-world moral norms in the same way that the conventions of science fiction per-
mit deviation from real-world physical laws? As “e Sun of the Second Creation”
demonstrates, the answer is “yes”. ere is an important symmetry between physics and
morality in fictions: violations of real-world physical laws are convention-discordant in
some genres but not others, and violations of real-world moral norms are convention-
discordant in some genres but not others.24 As noted in section 1.3, other philosophers
have suggested that real-world examples of morality fictions might be found in genres
such as cartoons, surrealist fiction, and fairytales and fables.25 Although these genres
are not defined by moral deviances, their conventions nevertheless permit violations
of real-world moral norms. Once we expand our stock of examples beyond the
realistic fictions that oen serve as paradigms in aesthetic discussions, it becomes clear
that morality fictions are possible—indeed, many of them are actual—and resistance
phenomena are about far more than moral deviance. e diversity found in the moral
landscapes of fictional worlds is made possible by the different genre conventions that
govern various fictional worlds.
3.2 e Imaginative Puzzle
We can also see the role that genre expectations play in addressing the imaginative
puzzle by elaborating on the difference between the two stories earlier. e same moral
proposition, Mary [Ixchel] did the right thing by giving up her baby to be sacrificed, is
comparatively more difficult to imagine when presented in “Seeing the Light” than
when presented in “e Sun of the Second Creation”. is asymmetry in people’s
24In conversation, Kendall Walton points out a curious asymmetry between science fiction and some
genres of morality fictions. While science fiction permits all kinds of deviations from real-world physical
laws, some genres of morality fictions, such as mythology, permit only specific deviations from real-world
moral norms. Despite the curiosity, this asymmetry does not undermine the present modest claim, that
there are genres in which deviations from real-world moral norms are permitted.
25In addition to the example fromWeinberg and Meskin (2006) mentioned in section 1.3, see also
discussions in Weinberg (2008), Todd (2009), Nanay (2010), and Willard (2015).
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typical psychological responses exist because people typically employ different genre
expectations during narrative engagement with the two stories.
Ultimately, the different genre expectations are grounded in the different corre-
sponding genre conventions that govern the stories. When reading the police proce-
dural “Seeing the Light”, competent readers typically automatically and unconsciously
expect the fictional world to have the same moral norms as the real world. So readers
have comparative difficulties with imagining that it is morally right for Mary to give up
her baby for sacrifice because the proposition is expectation-discordant. In contrast,
when reading the Aztec myth “e Sun of the Second Creation”, competent readers
typically do not automatically and unconsciously expect the fictional world to have the
same moral norms as the real world. So readers have no comparative difficulties with
imagining that it is morally right for Ixchel to give up her baby for sacrifice because the
proposition is expectation-concordant.
A proposition’s genre expectation-discordance is one factor that contributes to the
comparative difficulties with imagining it. As Todorov suggests, genre expectations
constrain what readers can easily imagine in the same way that genre conventions
constrain what authors can easily make fictional. A proposition is puzzling when
readers have no existing schemas to make sense of the proposition and no inclination
to form new schemas or adjust existing ones. In such cases, readers default to expecting
the fiction that contains the proposition to be realistic in all aspects. Although readers
could exert deliberate and conscious mental effort to override the realist expectations
to imagine the puzzling proposition, these expectations nevertheless make the puzzling
proposition comparatively difficult to imagine due to the additional mental effort
required.
As is the case with genre conventions, readers’ expectations can sometimes be
challenged and reshaped when there are sufficient rewards for doing so. Some of the
best works, one might argue, are precisely the ones that challenge readers to form new
genre expectations or reshape their existing ones. A diligent and skillful author might
be able to make initially puzzling propositions more easily imaginable by rewarding
readers with worthwhile aesthetic features in the work. Hence, it is only when readers
cannot find compensating aesthetic pleasure for the recalibration and re-habituation
of their expectations that they default to realist expectations. Note that the default of
realist expectations applies for all dimensions of a fictional world, not just the moral
and evaluative dimensions. Readers do not start off thinking every fiction that they
encounter is a science fiction and expecting violations of real-world physical laws. eir
default is simply to preserve systematic real-world features as much as possible unless
genre cues indicate otherwise.26
So, let us ask again, why does “Seeing the Light” evoke resistance phenomena?
To begin, although there are genres in which morality fictions can be found, this
story does not exhibit cues for any of them. More importantly, there are no apparent
aesthetically worthwhile features of the work that could compensate for or nullify
the initial experience of imaginative difficulties. Frankly, “Seeing the Light” is an
26Weisberg and Goodstein (2009) and Weisberg et al. (2013) give evidence from developmental psy-
chology for people’s reality bias in constructing fictional worlds.
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unremarkable story in its own right: the characters are hardly identifiable, the storyline
is hardly creative, and the writing is hardly stylish. However, such unremarkable
short stories are standard in the resistance phenomena literature because—aer all—
it is philosophers, and not fiction writers, who have authored them. Talented flash
fiction writers like Lydia Davis can use few words to great effect. Perhaps these writers
could have challenged and reshaped readers’ expectations with the same word count
without resorting to generic devices. Unfortunately for philosophers in the resistance
phenomena literature, they are not so talented in this respect.27 Without a diligent and
skillful author, an unremarkable fiction like “Seeing the Light” simply cannot do enough
to persuade readers to recalibrate and rehabituate their expectations. Consequently,
readers have comparative difficulties with imagining a proposition that is discordant
with respect to all of their accessible genre schemas.
3.3 e Phenomenological Puzzle
In addition to addressing the imaginative puzzle, genre expectations also have a role in
addressing the phenomenological puzzle. What drives the phenomenological experi-
ence that “Seeing the Light” evokes is the lack of the appropriate genre expectations that
make sense of the story. Without appropriate genre expectations, or schemas, people’s
narrative engagement with this story ceases to be fluent—that is, quick, automatic, and
unconscious. e lack of cognitive ease and the conscious effort demanded manifest
themselves as the jarring confusion that characterizes resistance phenomenology.
As is the case with the difficulties associated with the imaginative puzzle, the
experiences associated with the phenomenological puzzle could be either temporary or
persistent. Some literary works purposefully evoke a temporary sense of jarring confu-
sion as a distancing device to force readers to reconsider and reinterpret earlier parts of
the work. us, the phenomenology of resistance by itself need not be philosophically
puzzling. It is only when this phenomenology persists even aer repeated readings of
the whole work that there is a philosophical puzzle to be explained.
Genre expectations help us understand why the jarring phenomenology frequently
co-occur with the imaginative difficulties, whether they are temporary or persistent.
Both psychological responses result from a lack of appropriate genre expectations and
a corresponding lack of fluency in narrative engagement. Although the imaginative
puzzle and the phenomenological puzzle are conceptually distinct, they have the same
psychological basis. Only by recognizing the role of genre expectations in the psychol-
ogy of fictions can we arrive at a unifying explanation of the psychological aspect of
resistance phenomena.
27Todd (2009) also highlights the aesthetic flaws of philosophers’ stories. I deny that aesthetic flaws
directly influence readers’ comparative difficulties with imagining puzzling propositions, as Todd sug-
gests. Instead, I say that they only indirectly influence readers’ narrative engagements via the circuitous
relationships between genre expectations, fluency, and aesthetic pleasure. Uncovering those relationships
increases our understanding of the imaginative puzzle and the psychology of narrative engagement.
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3.4 e Genre Account, in the Grand Scheme ofings
We have arrived at an account of resistance phenomena that highlights genre’s role. e
genre account says that puzzling propositions are comparatively difficult to make fic-
tional because they are genre convention-discordant, comparatively difficult to imagine
because they are genre expectation-discordant, and generate a sense of jarring confu-
sion partly because readers lack the requisite genre expectations for fluent narrative
engagement. e genre account is not thewhole story, but it is an important supplement
to existing understanding of resistance phenomena.
e attraction of the genre account can be seen by showingwhy the early, influential
diagnosis of resistance phenomena remains incomplete. Recall from the introduc-
tion that, in explaining resistance phenomena, these accounts all emphasize partic-
ular propositions’ discordance with real-world norms and readers’ actual evaluative
attitudes and responses. However, this emphasis is explicated in terms of different
mechanisms by different accounts. Mechanistically, Gendler (2000, 2006) and Yablo
(2002) focus on the concepts invoked in puzzling propositions. Fiction authors cannot
determine how moral concepts apply. us, according to these philosophers, asking
readers to apply a moral concept differently than they actually would tends to evoke
resistance phenomena. Mechanistically, Walton (1994, 2006) and Weatherson (2004)
focus on the supervenience relations that link higher-level claims to their lower-level
bases. Fiction authors can change the lower-level claims that are fictional, but they
cannot change the supervenience relations that link higher-level claims, such as moral
claims, to their lower-level bases. us, according to them, violating the moral super-
venience relations that are taken to actually hold tends to evoke resistance phenomena.
Despite their mechanistic differences, these accounts all suffer from the same
problem due to their fundamental similarity in focusing on the real world and actual
responses: as they currently stand, they cannot help us explain why the same moral
proposition evokes resistance phenomena in “Seeing the Light” but not in “e Sun of
the Second Creation”. For Gendler and Yablo, the relevant actual concept application
regarding the moral rightness of giving up one’s baby for sacrifice is the same irrespec-
tive of which story we are engaging with. For Walton and Weatherson, the relevant
supervenience relations that actually hold between moral rightness and relevant lower-
level bases is the same irrespective of which story we are engaging with. erefore,
they all have to say the same thing about the respective moral proposition of the two
stories: either both are puzzling or neither are. As such, they are committed to say the
wrong thing about one of the two stories. In contrast, the genre account can avoid this
problem because it allows fictional worlds of different genres to have different concept-
applicability conditions and different fictional supervenience relationships—in virtue
of the different genre conventions that apply.
A complete diagnosis of resistance phenomena must take into account multiple
factors, including both the real-world norms and actual evaluations and responses as
well as genre. is explanatory cosmopolitanism is necessary because the normativity
and psychology of narrative engagement are complicated matters. As the field of
literary criticism demonstrates, theorists lean on multiple factors—some formal, some
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historical, and some institutional—in deciding what is fictional in a given narrative. In
everyday disagreements about fictions, multiple factors influence people’s psychological
responses. e same heartbreak soliloquy can cause a romantic to cry and a cynic to
laugh. Putting resistance phenomena in their proper context—narrative engagements—
therefore urges us to recognize their complexity.
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